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Abstract
This paper intends to further the understanding of the formal properties of (higher-
order) vagueness by connecting theories of (higher-order) vagueness with more 
recent work in topology. First, we provide a “translation” of Bobzien’s account of 
columnar higher-order vagueness into the logic of topological spaces. Since colum-
nar vagueness is an essential ingredient of her solution to the Sorites paradox, a cen-
tral problem of any theory of vagueness comes into contact with the modern math-
ematical theory of topology. Second, Rumfitt’s recent topological reconstruction of 
Sainsbury’s theory of prototypically defined concepts is shown to lead to the same 
class of spaces that characterize Bobzien’s account of columnar vagueness, namely, 
weakly scattered spaces. Rumfitt calls these spaces polar spaces. They turn out to 
be closely related to Gärdenfors’ conceptual spaces, which have come to play an 
ever more important role in cognitive science and related disciplines. Finally, Wil-
liamson’s “logic of clarity” is explicated in terms of a generalized topology (“locol-
ogy”) that can be considered an alternative to standard topology. Arguably, locology 
has some conceptual advantages over topology with respect to the conceptualization 
of a boundary and a borderline. Moreover, in Williamson’s logic of clarity, vague 
concepts with respect to a notion of a locologically inspired notion of a “slim bound-
ary” are (stably) columnar. Thus, Williamson’s logic of clarity also exhibits a certain 
affinity for columnar vagueness. In sum, a topological perspective is useful for a 
conceptual elucidation and unification of central aspects of a variety of contempo-
rary accounts of vagueness.
1 Introduction
This paper intends to further the understanding of the formal properties of (higher-
order) vagueness by connecting theories of (higher-order) vagueness with more 
recent work in topology. More precisely, we want to address the following topics. To 
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set the stage, we first offer a “translation” of Bobzien’s notion of columnar higher-
order vagueness into the logic of topological spaces (cf. Bobzien 2012, 2013, 2015). 
An essential ingredient for her solution to the Sorites paradox is casting the paradox 
in the framework of modal logic S4.1. The topological translation shows that S4.1 
can be characterized as the logic of weakly scattered spaces. These spaces exhibit 
a particularly nice behaviour with respect to the concept of a boundary, which 
suggests that weakly scattered spaces offer a convenient framework for Bobzien’s 
account of columnar boundaries.
The purpose of Rumfitt’s work on vagueness presented in The Boundary Stones 
of Logic (Rumfitt 2015 is similar. Rumfitt also seeks a classical solution to the Sori-
tes paradox in the framework of classical logic. For this purpose, he relies on regular 
open, non-classical semantics. More precisely, he offers a formally precise topologi-
cal reconstruction of Sainsbury’s theory of vague, prototypically defined concepts. 
This investigation leads him to the class of polar topological spaces, which are just 
those spaces that characterize modal logic S4.1 used by Bobzien to cope with the 
Sorites paradox, namely, weakly scattered spaces.
Third, we address Williamson’s “logic of clarity” (cf. Williamson 1994, 1999), 
the formal structure of which can be elucidated in terms of a generalized topology 
that Breysse and De Glas presented some years ago as an alternative to standard 
topology under the name “locology” (cf. Breysse and de Glas 2007). Arguably, 
locology has some conceptual advantages over standard topology with respect to 
the conceptualization of the notions of boundary and borderline. Moreover, in Wil-
liamson’s logic of clarity, vague concepts turn out to be almost columnar in the 
sense of Bobzien. More precisely, a natural notion of a “slim boundary” for the con-
cepts of “fixed-margin models” of the logic of clarity also presents stable columnar 
vagueness.
The touchstone for every theory of vagueness is whether it contributes to a solu-
tion to the Sorites paradox. Vague concepts may be characterized as concepts that 
possess borderline cases. According to Bobzien, one may distinguish between two 
kinds of higher-order vagueness: hierarchical higher-order vagueness and columnar 
higher-order vagueness:
Hierarchical higher-order vagueness is characterized by a hierarchy of consec-
utively higher orders of borderline cases of a vague predicate (i) that include 
clear (definite, determinate) borderline cases, and (ii) whose extensions do not 
overlap… Columnar higher-order vagueness differs from hierarchical higher-
order vagueness in that, extensionally, it contains just one kind of borderline 
cases, and each borderline case is radically higher order, or radically border-
line, i.e., borderline borderline…, ad infinitum (Bobzien 2015, 63).
Beyond the class of weakly scattered spaces, many subsets of topological spaces 
in general exhibit columnar vagueness. It can even be proven that for all topologi-
cal spaces, all subsets exhibit a concept of stable columnar vagueness that is only 
slightly weaker than Bobzien’s original version of columnar vagueness and suffices 
to defuse the suspicion that higher-order vagueness is an inconsistent notion.
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The topological explication of Bobzien’s concept of columnar vagueness is not 
only interesting in itself but also relevant for the topological account of vagueness 
recently proposed in Rumfitt (2015). In this book, the author’s main intention con-
cerning problems of vagueness is to offer a new “classical” solution to the Sorites 
paradox by relying on Mark Sainsbury’s influential idea about characterizing vague 
concepts. According to Sainsbury, concepts are “boundaryless” (cf. Sainsbury 1990; 
Wright 2007; Rumfitt 2015). Rumfitt offers a precise topological reconstruction 
of Sainsbury’s informal approach. Perhaps surprisingly, Rumfitt’s reconstruction 
leads to the same class of topological spaces that were already shown in Bobzien’s, 
namely, weakly scattered spaces.
The general result of this paper is that for the apparently different accounts of 
Bobzien, Rumfitt, and Williamson, the resulting concepts of vagueness turn out to 
be columnar (or stably columnar, in a sense to be rendered precise). This holds for 
Bobzien’s and Rumfitt’s accounts, which may be cast in a proper topological frame-
work, and for Williamson’s logic of clarity for which generalized topology may be 
more adequate. For all, higher-order vagueness turns out to be (stably) columnar. In 
sum, the topological perspective offered in this paper may be useful for the concep-
tual elucidation and unification of a variety of contemporary accounts of vagueness.
The outline of this paper is as follows: In Sect. 2, we recall some basic concepts 
and results from topology that are necessary for understanding the subsequent sec-
tions. As an application of the topological apparatus, Sect.  3 shows that the class 
of weakly scattered spaces provides an appropriate class of topological models for 
dealing with columnar vagueness. Section  4 shows that weakly scattered spaces 
also provide the appropriate framework for a topological elucidation of how vague 
concepts may be defined by prototypical or paradigmatic cases. Section 5 addresses 
Rumfitt’s solution to the Sorites paradox, which may be considered “semi-classi-
cal” since it is based on classical Boolean logic but uses non-classical regular open 
semantics. To persuade the reader that polar spaces should not be considered just a 
more or less contrived device taken from modern mathematics, Sect. 6 shows that 
the conceptual space approach put forward in cognitive science, linguistics and 
related sciences provides a rich source for polar spaces in the sense of Rumfitt (cf. 
Gärdenfors 2000, 2014; Zenker and Gärdenfors 2015). Indeed, conceptual spaces in 
Gärdenfors’ sense give rise to a special type of polar spaces in Rumfitt’s sense. As 
will be explained in detail, the Voronoi tessellation of conceptual space corresponds 
uniquely to the partition of polar space defined by its regular open concepts.
Section 7 resumes the topic of columnar subsets of arbitrary topological spaces 
(X, OX). It is proven that this class has the structure of a (non-complete) Boolean 
algebra with respect to the familiar set-theoretical Boolean operations union, inter-
section, and complement. Section 8 shows that Williamson’s logic of clarity gives 
rise to a notion of well-behaved stable columnar vagueness, although its defining 
modal operator C* does not satisfy the so-called axiom 4 of the modal logic S4. 
In Sect. 9, we close with some general considerations on the problem of how (for 
normal modal logics) the alternatives of columnar higher-order vagueness, sta-
ble columnar vagueness and “slim” stable columnar vagueness for KTB are to be 
assessed.
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2  Basics of Topology
Let us begin by recalling the basic topological definitions and results that will be 
used throughout this paper.
Definition 2.1 Let X be a (non-empty) set. A topological space is a pair (X, OX), 
where X is a set (of “points”) and OX is a family of subsets of X containing X and 
Ø that is closed under finite intersections and arbitrary unions of its elements. The 
elements of OX are called open sets of space X, and the set-theoretical complements 
of open sets are called closed sets. The family OX of open subsets of X is called a 
topology on X. ♦
The interior int(A) of a set A ⊆ X is the largest open set contained in A, and the 
closure cl(A) of A is the least closed set containing A. By Definition 2.1, int A is 
the union of all open subsets of A. Dually, the closure cl(A) is the intersection of all 
closed sets that contain A. Let CA denote the set-theoretical complement of A in X. 
Then, clearly, int A and cl A are interdefinable: intA = C cl CA and clA = C int CA. 
For a topological space (X, OX), the interior int and the closure cl can be conceived 
as operators on the set PX of subsets of X. From the Definition 2.1 of OX, it follows 
that these operators satisfy the so-called Kuratowski axioms:
Kuratowski Axioms 2.2 Let (X, OX) be a topological space, A, B ⊆ X. Then, the 
operators cl and int satisfy the following axioms.
(1) cl(A ∪ B) = cl(A) ∪ cl(B). (1)* int(A ∩ B) = int(A) ∩ int(B).
(2) cl(cl(A)) = cl(A). (2)* int(int(A)) = int(A).
(3) A ⊆ cl(A). (3)* int(A) ⊆ A.(4)
(4) cl(Ø) = Ø. (4)* int(X) = X.
Clearly, the axioms (1)–(4) are equivalent to (1)*–(4)*. In the following, we will use 
these axioms without always explicitly mentioning them.♦
Definition 2.3 Let (X, OX) be a topological space, A, B ⊆ X.
 (i) Set A is dense iff cl(A) = X, and set B is nowhere dense iff int(cl(B)) = Ø.
 (ii) A point x ∈ X is isolated iff the singleton {x} ∈ OX. The set of isolated points 
of X is denoted by ISO(X).
 (iii) (X, OX) is weakly scattered iff cl(ISO(X)) is dense in X, i.e., cl(ISO(X)) = X.♦
For a class K of topological spaces (X, OX), let L(K) denote the set of formulas 
of the modal propositional calculus that are valid for all members of K interpret-
ing modal operators □ and ◇ as interior operator int and closure operator cl, 
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respectively. Due to a fundamental result of McKinsey and Tarski, L(K) is a nor-
mal extension of S4. Set L(K) of formulas is called the modal logic of class K of 
topological spaces. For instance, let TOP be the class of all topological spaces and 
ALEX be the class of Alexandroff spaces1; then, L(TOP) = L(ALEX) = S4. Many 
results of this type have been obtained for special classes of topological spaces (cf., 
for instance, van Benthem and Bezhanishvili 2007; Bezhanishvili et al. 2003, 2004, 
or Gabelaia 2001). For this paper, the following theorem is fundamental:
Theorem 2.4 (Gabelaia 2003, Theorem 1.3.7, 1.3.8, pp. 16–17) 2 Let WSC be the 
class of weakly scattered spaces. Then, the modal logic L(WSC) that corresponds to 
WSC is S4.1, i.e., the extension of S4 by the McKinsey axiom.
(MK) □◇A ⇒ ◇□A.
The topological translation of (MK) is
(MK)top int(cl(A)) ⊆ cl(int(A))♦
2.5 Examples and Counter‑examples 
 (i) (X, PX) is a topological space called the discrete topological space on X. 
Clearly, (X, PX) is weakly scattered, since all points of X are isolated.
 (ii) For any set X, the structure (X, {Ø, X}) is a topological space called the 
indiscrete topology on X. If X has more than one element, (X, {Ø, X}) is not 
weakly scattered, since no point is isolated; rather, int({x}) = Ø for all x ∈ X. 
Any non-empty set A ⊆ X is dense with respect to the indiscrete topology (X, 
{Ø, X}).
 (iii) Let X be the set {0, 1} of two elements and OX = {Ø, {0}, X}. The topologi-
cal space (X, OX) is called the Sierpinski space. The only isolated point is 
point {0}, and clearly, cl({0}) = {0, 1}. Thus, the Sierpinski space is weakly 
scattered. Set {0} of the Sierpinski space is dense, and set {1} is closed and 
nowhere dense. It is not discrete, however.
 (iv) The real line (R, OR) endowed with the standard Euclidean topology is not 
weakly scattered, it does not satisfy the McKinsey axiom (MK)top: Let Q ⊆ R 
be the set of rational numbers. Then, intcl(Q) = R ⊄ cl(int(Q)) = Ø. The Euclid-
1 Recall that a topological space (X, OX) is Alexandroff if the arbitrary intersection of open sets is open, 
or, equivalently, if the arbitrary union of closed sets is closed.
2 Gabelaia’s terminology is somewhat different. To ensure that Gabelaia’s results are really equivalent to 
Theorem 2.4, the reader may consult Sect. 7 of this paper, particularly Lemmas 7.5 and 7.6. In most of 
the mathematical literature, Theorem 2.4 is considered “folklore” for which it is not necessary to give an 
exact source; see, e.g. Bezhanishvili et al. (2003).
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ean line (R, OR) lacks any isolated points. The set Q ⊆ R of rational numbers 
is dense in R. Set Z of integers is nowhere dense in R. ♦
These examples and counter-examples show that the concept of weakly scattered 
spaces is consistent and non-trivial: There are topological spaces that satisfy the 
requirements for weakly scattered spaces, e.g., (X, PX) or the Sierpinsiki space ({0, 
1}, {Ø, {0}, X}), but not all topological spaces (X, OX) are weakly scattered.
Of course, being consistent and non-trivial is not a compelling argument for the 
usefulness of the concept of weakly scattered spaces. Therefore, in the next section, 
we will introduce several examples of interesting weakly scattered spaces that are 
naturally related to issues of vagueness. More precisely, following Rumfitt (2015) 
we will show that weakly scattered spaces provide a convenient topological frame-
work for making precise Sainsbury’s idea that vague concepts should be considered 
“boundaryless” concepts that are defined by reference to prototypes or paradigms 
(cf. Sainsbury 1990; Wright 1992).
3  Weakly Scattered Spaces as Topological Models of Columnar 
Vagueness
Following Bobzien, vagueness may be defined in a framework of a modal logic 
based on an operator C such that CA is to be interpreted as “It is clear that A”, “It is 
definitely the case that A”, or similarly. In the following, C is assumed to be an S4 
operator (see Bobzien 2015).3 This means that the logic of C satisfies the following 
well-known conditions (cf. Dunn and Hardegree 2001):
Definition 3.1 The modal logic of the clearness operator C is defined as an exten-
sion of classical Boolean propositional logic by a unary sentential operator C such 
that for all well formed formulas A and B, the following expression are valid:
(1) C (A —> B) —> (CA —> CB) (Axiom K)
(2) CA —> A (Axiom T)
(3) CA —> CCA (Axiom 4)
(4) If |— A, then |— CA. (Rule of 
Necessita-
tion).♦
With the aid of C, operator U is defined as
3 This assumption is far from unanimously accepted. Rather, it is a quite controversial issue. For a vari-
ety of arguments in favour and against of this assumption see Bobzien (2015), Heck (1993), Williamson 
(1994) and Wright (2007). For a general survey see Zardini (2006). The topological perspective of this 
paper does not yield a direct argument in favour or against the thesis that a reasonable theory of vague-
ness has to be developed in the framework of S4. At least, it elucidates some of the consequences of this 
thesis in a particularly “intuitive” way (for those who consider the topological way of thinking as more 
intuitive than the set-theoretical one).
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U is to be interpreted as unclearness in the sense that UA is to be read as “It is not 
clear that A, and it is not clear that not A”. Abbreviating the nth iteration U •… • U 
of U by Un (n ≥ 1), Bobzien (2015, 2013) defines an account of vagueness as colum-
nar4 if and only if its unclearness operator U satisfies the equation
In general, (3.3) is not satisfied if the modal logic of clearness operator C is just 
logic S4 defined in Definition 3.1.5 Rather, Bobzien (2015, section II) shows that the 
validity of (3.3) requires a strengthening of S4, namely, S4.1, characterized as the 
extension of S4 by the so-called McKinsey axiom (MK) (cf. Theorem 2.4):
McKinsey and Tarski (1944) proved that modal system S4 is the logic of all topo-
logical spaces in the sense that a proposition is valid in S4 if and only if its topologi-
cal interpretation is valid in all topological spaces. They thereby laid the foundation 
for the new discipline of “spatial logic”, which would become a fruitful symbio-
sis of modal logic and topology. For a contemporary survey, see van Benthem and 
Bezhanishvili (2007). McKinsey and Tarski’s result has been generalized in many 
ways, with a correspondence established between certain classes of topological 
spaces on the one hand and certain extensions S4.X of standard S4 logic on the 
other. For the purposes of this paper, the following special case is relevant: Let WSC 
denote the class of weakly scattered topological spaces (to be defined precisely in 
the next section). Then, the extension of S4 corresponding to this class of spaces 
is S4.1 (cf. van Benthem and Bezhanishvili 2007; Bezhanishvili et al. 2003, 2004; 
Gabelaia 2001).
In the following, we will exploit the correspondence between the S4.1 modal 
logic and the topology of weakly scattered spaces (X, OX) to elucidate the formal 
properties of columnar vagueness. Then, from a topological perspective, the clear-
ness operator C corresponds to the topological operator int of the interior, and its 
operator U of unclearness corresponds to topological boundary operator bd defined 
by
In terms of the topological concept of a boundary, the basic claim of the colum-
nar account of vagueness reads
(3.2)퐔A = NOT퐂A&NOT (퐂(NOTA)))
(3.3)퐔nA = 퐔A1 for all A and n ≥ 1.
(3.4)퐂NOT퐂NOTA⇒ NOT퐂NOT퐂A
(3.5)bd(A) ∶= Cint(A)&Cint(CA) = cl(A) ∩ cl(CA)
(3.6)bd(bd(A)) = bd(A) for all A ⊆ X
4 The “columnar higher-order vagueness” issue was first discussed in Bobzien (2010), and the term itself 
was introduced in Bobzien (2013).
5 In S4, the weaker equation  UnA = U2A can be proved for all A and n ≥ 2; see Sect. 7, Corollary 7.4.
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As is well known, (3.6) does not hold for all topological spaces (X, OX) and all 
A ⊆ X.6 Thus, the following definition is meaningful:
Definition 3.7 Let (X, OX) be a topological space. A subset A ⊆ X is called a 
columnar set (with respect to the topology OX) iff bdbd(A) = bd(A).♦
Bobzien’s result that S4.1 can be characterized as the modal logic of C for which 
corresponding uncertainty operator U satisfies U2 = U is translated by Theorem 2.4 
in the following theorem of topology:
Theorem 3.8 A topological space (X, OX) is a weakly scattered space iff all sub-
sets A of X are columnar; i.e., for all A, one has bd(bd(A)) = bd(A).♦
The fact that Q is not columnar in Euclidean space (R, OR) shows that famil-
iar topological spaces such as the real line (R, OR) may differ considerably from 
weakly scattered spaces. Indeed, as will be shown in the following sections, weakly 
scattered spaces have some very peculiar properties.
Bobzien and Rumfitt (2019) sketch a proof that for logic S4.1, operators C and 
U are interdefinable. The topological translation of this fact asserts that for weakly 
scattered spaces (X, OX), interior operator int and boundary operator bd are inter-
definable. This result can be strengthened. Already in 1927, Zarycki proved that for 
all topological spaces (X, OX), boundary operator bd and interior operator int are 
interdefinable (cf. Zarycki 1927).7 In logical terms, this amounts to the fact that for 
modal logic S4, operator □ and contingency operator ∇ are interdefinable, although 
the correspondence is more complex than that of C and U given for S4.1 by Bobzien 
and Rumfitt.
Moreover, in Sect. 6, we will show that for all topological spaces (X, OX), many 
subsets A of X are columnar; i.e., they satisfy UA = U2A. This suggests that colum-
narity is a rather common phenomenon.
From now on, with the exception of Sect. 8, we will use topological terminology 
throughout the paper. That is, instead of using modal operators C and U, we will use 
the corresponding topological operators int and bd. The only remaining reference to 
a logically motivated terminology will be that the expressions “columnar boundary” 
and “columnar set” are used to refer to a topological boundary operator bd that satis-
fies  bd2 = bd.
From the viewpoint of traditional topology, weakly scattered spaces are a rather 
elusive species. Familiar topological spaces such as Euclidean spaces and their 
derivatives are anything but weakly scattered. Thus, if one intends to use topologi-
cal means for the explication of concepts such as vagueness and borderlineness, it 
is desirable to have a reservoir of “concrete” weakly scattered spaces that are “natu-
rally related” to matters of vagueness. Here, the polar spaces of Rumfitt come to the 
7 Another proof of this result may be found in Mormann (2013).
6 The real numbers R endowed with the familiar Euclidean topology OR and subset Q of rational num-
bers of R provide an elementary counterexample since bd(Q) = R and bdbd(Q) = Ø (see Sect. 7).
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rescue. It will be shown that polar spaces, recently introduced by Rumfitt (2015), 
provide a precise formal reconstruction of Sainsbury’s idea that vague concepts such 
as colour concepts appear to be “boundaryless” concepts.
The concept of columnar boundaries makes sense not only for weakly scattered 
spaces but also for topological spaces in general. We will show that for all topo-
logical spaces (X, OX), many subsets are columnar. Moreover, for all topological 
spaces the set of columnar subsets has some nice structural properties, namely, it is 
a Boolean algebra.
4  Weakly Scattered Spaces as a Framework for Prototypically 
Defined Concepts
The aim of this section is to show that there are plenty of weakly scattered spaces 
that are relevant for issues of vagueness.
Our starting point is Sainsbury’s influential idea that typical vague predicates 
such as “bald”, “tall”, “rich”, and “red”. are defined not by determining their bound-
aries but by referencing positive and negative paradigms or prototypes (cf. Sains-
bury 1990). As Rumfitt put it:
Sainsbury invites us to consider a very familiar case: the colour spectrum, as 
displayed, for example, in an illustration in a book on colour. Looking care-
fully, we can discern no boundaries between the different colours: they stand 
out as clearly different, yet there are no sharp divisions. There are bands, but 
no bounds. This does nothing to impede the classificatory process: The spec-
trum is a paradigm of classification. (Sainsbury 1990, 258) The spectrum ena-
bles us to attach senses to colour terms not because it shows boundaries but 
because it displays colour paradigms or poles. … [I] liken paradigms to gravi-
tational poles, that is, massive bodies. If a small body is sufficiently close to a 
gravitational pole, it will be drawn towards it, rather as we are drawn to clas-
sify as red those objects that are sufficiently close in colour to a paradigm, or 
pole, of red. (Rumfitt 2015, 236)
From an extensional, set-theoretical point of view, “red” and “non-red” are logi-
cally and conceptually on par: One is just the negation of the other. The prototypi-
cal approach defends a quite different point of view: Even if there is a paradigm 
of “red”, there is no paradigm of “non-red”. Rather, any other colour will serve as 
a paradigm of how not to be red but only by virtue of its positive classification as 
another colour (cf. Sainsbury 1990, 258).8 As Rumfitt shows, the distinction of a 
set P of prototypical elements in a domain X naturally endows it with a topologi-
cal structure OX. Following Rumfitt, topological structures obtained in this way are 
8 In some sense, the prototypical classification of colours works in a similar way as the characterization 
of implicitly defined mathematical concepts works. A system of geometrical concepts such as “points”, 
“lines”, and “planes” is grasped as a whole. Thus, “point” is an important geometrical concept defined in 
relation to other geometrical concepts, but “non-point” is clearly not.
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called polar topological spaces. As will be shown in this paper, polar topological 
spaces can be characterized as weakly scattered spaces that we already met in the 
topological translation of Bobzien’s account of columnar vagueness.
The necessary ingredients for constructing a polar topology for a domain may 
be succinctly described as follows: Assume that there is given a set X of objects to 
be classified and a subset P of X to be considered as a set of distinguished elements 
that are “paradigmatic” or “prototypical” objects of X. In the terminology of Rumfitt 
(2015), they are called poles. Set P of poles is used to classify the objects of X as 
follows:
Definition 4.1 (Pole Distribution for X) Let X be a non-empty set, P be a non-
empty subset of X, and  2P be the power set of A. A function X —m—> 2P is a pole 
distribution iff it satisfies the following requirements:
(1) For all x ∈ X, sets m(x) ⊆ P are not empty.
(2) For all x ∈ X and all p ∈ P, m(x) = {p} iff x = p.
A pole distribution is denoted by (X, m, P).♦
For colour experiences, the working of a pole distribution can be described as fol-
lows: Each shade of colour may be assumed to be in the “domain of influence” of at 
least one prototype. This means that if a is a shade of blue sufficiently similar to B, 
then m(a) = {B}. If, however, a competent non-colour-blind observer feels unable to 
say whether a is red or blue, then m(a) = {R, B}. It seems plausible to assume that 
for all prototypical experiences p ∈ P, a polar distribution m satisfies m(p) = {p}; i.e., 
every prototypical experience p is only in the sphere of influence of itself. Epistemi-
cally, this means that different poles are easily distinguishable, i.e., epistemologi-
cally clearly different.
Rumfitt observed that a prototype distribution (X, m, P) defines a topology on X 
(cf. Rumfitt 2015, 243, Fn. 15):
Proposition 4.2 A pole distribution (X, m, P) defines a topology (X, OX) by an 
interior kernel operator PX —int—> PX
The topological space (X, OX) is called a polar topological space. Subset P ⊆ X is 
called the set of poles.
Proof To check that int satisfies Kuratowski axioms (1)*–(4)* of Definition 2.1, see 
Rumfitt (2015, 243–244).♦
Proposition 4.3 Let (X, OX) be the topological space defined by a pole distribution 
(X, m, P). For all x ∈ X, the smallest open set of the polar topology OX that contains 
x is set V(x) : = {x}∪ m(x). For elements p ∈ P and x ∈ X − P, one calculates
y ∈ int(A) ∶= y ∈ Aand∀p ∈ P(p ∈ m(y)⇒ p ∈ A) (A ⊆ X)
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int(p) = {p}, int(x) = Ø, V(x) = {x} ∪ m(x)
cl(x) = {x}, cl(p) = {x; p ∈ m(x)}, int(cl(p)) = {x; {p} = m(x)}
Proof Let us prove V(x) = {x}∪m(x). According to the definition of the operator int, 
one has y ∈ int({x}∪m(x)) ⇔ y ∈ {x}∪m(x) & ∀p(p∈m(y) ⇒ p ∈ {x}∪m(x)). Clearly, 
every element in {x} ∪ m(x) satisfies this condition. On the other hand, any smaller 
set properly containing {x} ∪ m(x) clearly does not satisfy the condition. For two 
different elements, x and y V(x) and V(y) are different. Hence, X is a  T0 space. 
Thus, sets {{x} ∪ m(x), x ∈X} form a unique minimal base for polar topology OX 
on X.9♦
From Proposition 4.3, one immediately obtains a pleasing corollary that relates 
Rumfitt’s account of polar spaces with Bobzien’s account of columnar vagueness:
Corollary 4.4 A polar topological space (X, OX) is weakly scattered. More pre-
cisely, the set of isolated points ISO(X) of X is just the set P of poles. This set is 
dense in X, i.e., cl(P) = cl(ISO(X) = X.
Proof First, we show that the singletons {p} of poles p ∈ P are open in the 
polar topology, i.e., {p} ∈ OX. Then, it is proved that cl(P) = X. Let q ∈ P. By 
Proposition  4.3 of int for {q}, one has y ∈ int(q) iff y ∈ {q} and ∀p(p ∈ P and 
p ∈ m(y) ⇒ p ∈ A). By definition of a pole distribution m, for a pole q, there is only 
one pole in m(q), namely, q itself. Hence, {q} is open for q ∈ P. Only slightly more 
difficult is the calculation of cl(q): By definition, closure operator cl of (X, OX) is 
given by (cf. Rumfitt 2015, p. 244) x ∈ cl(A) := x ∈ A or ∃p ∈ P(p ∈ m(x) and p ∈ A). 
For A = {q}, q ∈ P, this yields cl(q) : = {x; q ∈ m(x)}. To show that set P of poles is 
just the set ISO(X) of the isolated elements of X and is dense in X, one first observes 
that X is Alexandroff; therefore, one has cl(P) = ∪p∈P cl(p). Now, by definition of m 
for all x, set m(x) is not empty. Hence, every x is an element of at least one set cl(p). 
Therefore, cl(P) is dense in X; i.e., X is weakly scattered. ♦
Corollary 4.5 Let (X, OX) be the polar space defined by the distribution (X, m, P). 
Denote the Boolean algebra of regular open subsets by O*X. Then, O*X is isomor-
phic to 2P of P by the map 2P—intcl—> O*X defined for Q ∈ 2P by
It is easily proved that the polar topology (X, OX) of the colour circle is not 
trivial, i.e., OX ≠ {Ø, X}, PX. More interesting is the fact that it does not satisfy the 
Brouwer axiom (B) and the converse MK* of the McKinsey axiom:
intcl(Q) ∶= intcl(∪{intcl(q); q ∈ Q}.♢
9 The existence of the minimal basis V(x) renders (X, OX) an Alexandroff space (cf. Alexandroff 1937).
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Proposition 4.6 Let (X, OX) be the colour circle endowed with the polar topology. 
Then, neither Brouwer’s axiom B nor the converse MK* of McKinsey’s axiom is 
valid10:
(i) Brouwer’s axiom B CA ⊆ int(C(int(CA))
(ii) Converse McKinsey axiom (MK)* cl(int(A)) ⊆ int(cl(A))
Proof Let (X, OX) be the polar topology on X defined by a polar distribu-
tion (X, m, P). We may assume that for p ∈ P, one has intcl(p)) ≠ {p}. That is, {x; 
m(x) = {p}} ≠ {p}. Take A = X − {p}. Then, Brouwer’s axiom (B) requires that {p} 
⊆ int(C(int(C(X − {p})) = int(X − {p}). Clearly, however, {p} ⊄ int(X − {p}). Hence, 
the polar space (X, OX) does not satisfy (B).
The converse (MK)* of the McKinsey axiom (MK) is disproved by consider-
ing A = {p}, p ∈ P. Then, one obtains cl(int(p)) = {x; p ∈ m(x)} and int(cl(p)) = {x; 
{p} = m(x)}. Clearly, {x; p ∈ m(x)} ⊄ intcl(p)) = {x; {p} = m(x)}. Thus, (MK)* does 
not hold.♦
Proposition 4.3 offers a complete description of the topology of polar spaces (X, 
OX). Let us check that intuitively satisfying results are obtained for the paradig-
matic example of the colour spectrum. More precisely, let S be the set of colour 
experiences and P ⊆ S be a finite subset of paradigmatic colour experiences such as 
“red” (r), “orange” (o), “blue” (b), and “yellow” (y). Let (S, m, P) be an appro-
priate polar distribution S—m—2P. According to Rumfitt, the extension of a basic 
colour concept such as “red” is given by the regular open subset of S intcl(r) gen-
erated by {r}. One calculates, as it should be, int(cl(r)) = {x; m(x) = {r}}. In other 
words, the extension of the concept “red” is given by the set of all colour experi-
ences that are related to only one prototype, namely, r. Experiences related to two 
paradigmatic colour experiences, e.g., “orange” and “red”, are described as those 
x ∈ S with m(x) = {r, o}.11 Proposition  4.3 also offers a compelling example that 
open but not regular open subsets cannot be considered to represent “natural” con-
cepts: Given intcl(r), assume G ⊆ intcl(r)) a set of non-prototypical shades of red. By 
Proposition 4.3, set G is closed. Hence, set (intcl(r)) − G) is open but, of course, not 
regular open. Obviously, (intcl(r)) − G) can hardly be considered the extension of a 
well-behaved colour predicate, since any “arbitrary” set G of shades is missing. This 
11 For the linear colour spectrum, all colour experiences can be influenced by at most two prototypical 
experiences, but of course, there may be polar spaces for which mixed non-paradigmatic experiences of 
three or more prototypical experiences exist.
10 The axioms (MK)* and (B) have a certain relevance for epistemological matters: (MK)* is charac-
teristic for modal system S4.2 corresponding to the class of extremally disconnected spaces that have 
proven useful for modeling the concept of knowledge (cf. Baltag et al. 2018). Brouwer’s axiom (B) is 
an axiom of Williamson’s logic of clarity (cf. Williamson 1994, 1999) based on modal operator C*; see 
Sect. 8. This emphasizes the necessity of strictly distinguishing operators C and C*, although their infor-
mal characterization in English may seem rather similar.
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confirms Rumfitt’s conjecture that the extension of any colour predicate is to be a 
regular open set (cf. Rumfitt 2015, p. 244/245).12
Rumfitt discusses his topological reconstruction of Sainsbury’s idea by linear 
colour spectrum S whose poles are linearly ordered from red on the left end and 
blue on the right side of the spectrum (cf. Rumfitt 2015, 235ff). As is well known, 
this system is not the only system that can be used to order colour experiences. For 
instance, instead of a linear structure, one may use a colour circle in which col-
ours are circularly ordered and the ends of the linear spectrum are identified. The 
resulting topological space is again a polar space. As Rumfitt rightly points out, the 
construction of a polar topological space can be carried out for any vague concept 
whatsoever provided that it is defined by prototypes. A fortiori, the linear colour 
spectrum as well as the colour circle yield (different) polar topological spaces. For 
our considerations this difference is not relevant.
In sum, for all domains X endowed with a polar distribution (X, m, P), Rumfitt’s 
construction can be carried out.13 Vague concepts of X have regular open extensions 
intcl(∪intcl(q); q ∈ Q ⊆ P} ∈ O*X. In the next section, we will show that this result 
can be used to obtain a solution to the Sorites paradox based on classical Boolean 
logic and (not-so-classical) regular open semantics.
Clearly, polar topological spaces differ considerably from more familiar topologi-
cal spaces, such as Euclidean spaces. For instance, in contrast to Euclidean spaces 
(non-trivial), polar topologies do not satisfy separation axioms  T2 and  T1, and they 
have isolated points. These differences should be considered an advantage. Consider 
the colour spectrum or the colour circle. Usually, the underlying sets of these spaces 
are thought to be endowed with a (Euclidean) metric. This structure produces many 
representational artefacts that lack any possible empirical meaning. For instance, 
what does it mean that certain colour experiences x, y, z, and w are such that the 
distance between x and y is the same as the distance between z and w? It seems 
difficult, to say the least, to interpret such an assertion (or its negation) as empiri-
cally meaningful. In contrast, assuming that the colour circle is endowed only with 
a much more modest polar topology, such empirically unfounded assertions cannot 
even be formulated.
12 This claim has to be understood with appropriate qualifications, of course. Otherwise it is obviously 
wrong. Clearly, colour concepts like “scarlet”, “maroon”, “turquoise”, or “olive” cannot be expressed in 
a language that is based on a simple pole distribution (X, m, P) possessing only the basic terms “red”, 
“green”, etc. Rather, what is needed to express “scarlet” is a pole distribution (X, m′, P′) such that either 
“scarlet” has its own pole p′∈ P′, or the extension of “scarlet” is the (connected) sum of two (or more) 
regular open subsets of (X, O′X), O′X defined by (X, m′, P′).
13 Two special cases of polar distributions may be particularly mentioned. Clearly, if P = {p} ⊆ X, every 
distribution (X, m, P) is trivial, i.e., m(x) = {p} for x ∈ X. More interesting is the case P = {p, p′}. In this 
case, p and p′ may be interpreted as prototypes of opposite concepts, e.g. “rich” and “poor”, “silly” and 
“intelligent” etc. In many paradigmatic cases of concepts for which a kind of Sorites makes sense, how-
ever, opposites have to be introduced more or less artificially. For instance, if X is the class of men, then 
the opposite of “bald” is something like “having a scalp with at least 100.000 hairs”. This, however, is 
not an insuperable obstacle to apply the apparatus of polar distributions also to these cases.
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5  Rumfitt’s Solution to the Sorites Paradox in the Framework 
of Classical Logic and Regular Open Semantics
Given a topological space (X, OX), set O * X of regular open subsets of X is defined 
as the subset of elements A of OX that satisfy A = int(cl(A)). As is well known (cf. 
Tarski 1938, p. 448) O * X can be endowed with the structure of a complete Boolean 
algebra with respect to operations ∧ (“and”), ∨ (“or”) and ¬ (“not”) defined as 
follows:
Using (5.1), O * X can be used to define an adequate interpretation for the calcu-
lus of classical propositional logic as follows:
Definition 5.2 14 Let L be a propositional language with propositional variables, 
a, b, …, and connectives ∧, ∨, —> and ¬ to be interpreted as “and”, “or” “if … 
then”, and “not”. Let (X, OX) be a topological space and O * X be the Boolean 
algebra of regular open sets. A regular open interpretation of L in O * X is a map 
L —r— > O * X, for which r(a) ∈ O * X, such that
(1) r(a ∧ b) := r(a) ∩ r(b). (2) r(a ∨ b) := intcl(r(a) ∪ r(b)),
(3) r(a —> b) := int(Cr(a) ∪ r(b)). (4) r(¬a) := Ccl(r(a)).
A regular open interpretation boils down to a familiar set-theoretical interpretation if 
(X, OX) = (X, PX).♦
The main advantage of a regular open interpretation resides in the interpretation 
of disjunctions of regular open concepts that Rumfitt uses to defuse the notorious 
inductive argument of the Sorites paradox in an elegant way. Before we discuss this 
in detail, let us consider the following toy example:
Example 5.3 Let X = {N, 1, 2, …, 100, S} and (X, m, P) be the polar distribution 
defined by m(N) = {N}, m(S) = {S}, and m(i) = {S, N} for 1 ≤ i ≤ 100. Let (X, OX) 
be the resulting polar topological space with interior operator int and closure opera-
tor cl. By Proposition 4.3, one calculates
For the regular open disjunction of the regular open concepts intcl(N) and 
intcl(S), one calculates
(5.1)
(i) A ∧ B = A ∩ B, (ii) A ∨ B ∶= intcl(A ∪ B), (iii) ¬A ∶= int(CA)
cl(N) = {1, 2, … , 100, N}, intcl(N) = {N}
cl(S) = {1, 2, … , 100, S}, intcl(S) = {S}
14 This definition can be found already in Tarski (1938, Definition 4.1, p. 434 with comments on p. 
448)).
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That is, all i ∈ X satisfy disjunction 〈N〉 ∨ 〈S〉, but none satisfies either 〈N〉 or 〈S〉. 
In other words, satisfaction does not distribute over the regular open disjunction ∨. 
Expressed in terms of truth, for all x ∈ X, the proposition “x is 〈N〉 ∨ 〈S〉” is true, 
but for most x ∈ X, the propositions “x is 〈N〉” and “x is 〈S〉” are false.♦
Based on a well-known argument of Wright (2007), Rumfitt shows that the Sori-
tes argument leads to a paradox thesis of the existence of sharp cutoff points of a 
Sorites series. Starting with the following setting, the details are as follows:
Let us suppose, then, that we have a sequence of one hundred transparent tubes 
of paint,  a1,…,  a100, with the following properties: tube  a1 is clearly red; tube 
 a100 is clearly orange and hence clearly not red; but for each n, tube  an+1 is only 
marginally more orange (and hence only marginally less red) than its predeces-
sor an. Indeed, let us suppose that an observer with good eyesight, when view-
ing any pair of adjacent tubes  an and  an+1 together in white light but without 
comparing them with other tubes, is unable to perceive any difference in col-
our between them. That is, we suppose that any two adjacent members of the 
sequence are indiscriminable in colour. In such a case, the claim that nowhere 
in the sequence is a red tube immediately followed by a non-red tube seems 
highly plausible. (Rumfitt 2015, 220)
Faithfully following Wright’s original argumentation, Rumfitt shows that using clas-
sical Boolean logic, this setting of adjacent pairwise indistinguishable transparent 
tubes leads to the following “unpalatable disjunction”:
This disjunction seems “unpalatable” since it apparently asserts that there is a 
tube  ai that is red and adjacent to a tube  ai+1 that is indistinguishable in colour from 
 ai but is not red. This would amount to admitting the existence of a sharp cutoff of 
the vague concept R, which seems absurd. This absurd assertion can be avoided by 
using regular open semantics of regular open predicates in the following way.
First, one should observe that for a given polar space (X, OX) defined by a polar 
distribution (X, m, P), the Cartesian product  X100 := X × … (100 times)… × X can be 
considered a polar space whose polar structure is defined by (X × ··· × X, m × ··· × m, 
P × ··· × P). Then, (5.4) can be conceived as a complex proposition about element 
a = 〈a1, …,  a100〉 ∈ of  X100 by interpreting propositions  Rai as asserting that the 
ith component of sequence a is red. Indeed, the predicate “the ith component of a 
sequence 〈x1 …,x100〉 is red” is easily shown to be regular open in  (X100,  OX100). In 
sum, (5.4) can be interpreted as a disjunction of regular open predicates of Cartesian 
product  X100. As Rumfitt points out
When understood in that way, [(5.4)] is entirely innocuous. All it says is that 
when classifying entire sequences of coloured objects, whose members are 
arranged in order of gradually decreasing redness from something clearly red 
to something clearly not red, either the second or the third or… or the 100th 
⟨N⟩ ∨ ⟨S⟩ = intcl({N, S}) = {N, 1,… , 100, S} = X.
(5.4)(Ra1&¬Ra2) ∨ (Ra2&¬Ra3) ∨ … ∨ (Ra99&¬Ra100)
(
Rai = ai is red
)
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object will be the first object not classified as red. That claim is obviously true. 
It does not, however, entail the existence of a sharp boundary to the concept 
red, which is a mode of classifying a single object in respect of its colour. 
(Rumfitt 2015, p. 253)
6  Polar Spaces and Conceptual Spaces
Polar spaces do not only arise as by-products in the topological reconstruction of 
prototypically defined vague concepts. A fruitful source for polar spaces can be 
found in cognitive psychology and related disciplines, in which conceptual spaces 
have played a crucial role since they were introduced some 20 years ago by Gärden-
fors (see Gärdenfors 2000, 2014; Gärdenfors and Zenker 2015).
In its simplest version, a conceptual space is given by a metrical space (S, d) 
endowed with a finite set P ⊆ S of prototypes. The elements of S represent objects, 
experiences, or processes of a certain kind, for instance, colours, tastes, and sounds. 
Elements x and y of S become more similar to each other as their distance decreases. 
In the following, such a structure is denoted by (S, P, d). Prototypes P serve as 
“centres of gravity” much in the same way that they do in the Sainsbury/Rumfitt 
approach of polar spaces. Conceptual spaces and polar spaces have in common that 
they describe concepts “more geometrico”, namely, as appropriate regions of (topo-
logically or geometrically structured) spaces. Thus, both accounts may be seen as 
versions of a spatial logic.
More precisely, conceptual spaces (S, P, d) naturally give rise to polar spaces (S, 
P,  md) as follows:
Proposition 6.1 Let (S, P, d) be a conceptual space. For x ∈ S, define P(x) := {d(x, 
p); p ∈ P}. Since P is finite, for all P(x), its subset M(x) of minimal elements is not 
empty. Moreover, for p ∈ P, one has M(p) = {p}. Then, a pole distribution (S, m, P) 
with its polar space (S, OS) is defined by S —m—> 2P and m(x) := M(x).♦
Conceptual spaces (S, P, d) and polar spaces (X, m, P) differ in the kind of struc-
ture that is used for defining concepts as more geometrico. If S is assumed to be 
equipped with a Euclidean metric, categorization by prototypes results in a so-called 
Voronoi tessellation of conceptual space S. A characteristic feature of a Voronoi tes-
sellation of a conceptual space is that the space is partitioned into finitely many con-
vex regions. This led Gärdenfors to put forward “criterion P” as a central idea of his 
approach, in which “good”, i.e., natural, concepts are geometrically singled out as 
convex regions (cf. Gärdenfors 2000, p.92/93):
6.2 Criterion P Let (S, P, d) be a conceptual space S endowed with a Euclidean met-
rical structure d. Then, a natural property of (S, P, d) is a convex region of S.♦
The problem with “criterion P” is that Euclidean spaces possess a profusion 
of convex regions that, according to (6.2), must be considered natural concepts. 
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Therefore, a profusion of infinitely many allegedly natural properties is generated. 
This lacks plausibility. As is easily seen, the polar approach does not suffer from this 
unwanted profusion of “natural” concepts. Moving from the conceptual space (S, P, 
d) to the polar distribution (S,  md, P), one ends up in polar space (S, OS) such that 
the atoms of O*S are just finitely many regular open cells of the Voronoi tessellation 
of (S, P, d). In other words, the austere topological structure defined by (S,  md, P) 
suffices to generate the really important part of the categorizing tessellation of the 
conceptual space S, namely, the regular open cells of the tessellation. This means 
that the structural austerity of polar spaces really helps reduce problems caused by 
representational artefacts. Relying on (S,  md, P) instead of (S, P, d) is a convenient 
way to avoid an infinite profusion of allegedly natural predicates. On the other hand, 
the framework of polar spaces is still sufficiently complex to draw important distinc-
tions: For instance, polar structures suffice to distinguish topologically between the 
colour circle and the linear colour spectrum.
7  The Boolean Algebra of Columnar Sets of a Topological Space
In this section, we show that every topological space (X, OX) comes with a large 
class of columnar subsets A ⊆ X, i.e., satisfy bd(bd(A)) = bd(A). Moreover, the class 
of these subsets has the structure of a Boolean algebra (with respect to the set-theo-
retical operations inherited from set X).
Definition 7.1 A set A ⊆ X of a topological space (X, OX) is called a McKinsey set 
of (X, OX) if and only if bd(bd(A)) = bd(A). The set of McKinsey sets of (X, OX) is 
denoted by MKX.
If (X, OX) is weakly scattered, all subsets of X are columnar sets, i.e., MKX = PX. 
In general, however, this is not the case, as is shown by the following elementary 
example:
Example 7.2 Let (R, OR) be the real line with the standard Euclidean topol-
ogy. Boundary bd(Q) of set Q of rational numbers is not columnar, i.e., 
bd(Q) ≠ bd(bd(Q)).
Proof As is easily calculated, Q and its complement CQ are dense in R. Hence, 
bd(Q) = R and bd(bd(Q)) = bd(bd(bd(Q))) = Ø.♦
Clearly, for all topological spaces (X, OX), one has MKX ⊆ PX. Weakly scat-
tered spaces (X, OX) are characterized as spaces for which MKX = PX. In the rest of 
this section, we show that for all topological spaces, MKX has a very nice algebraic 
structure; namely, MKX is a Boolean algebra with respect to the set-theoretical 
operations ∩, ∪, and C. For the proof, we need some lemmas.
Lemma 7.3 Let (X, OX) be a topological space. Then, OX ∪ CX ⊆ MKX; i.e., if A is 
an open set or a closed set, then bd(A) = bd(bd(A)).
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Proof Assume A to be open. By definition, bd(A) = cl(A) ∩ cl(CA) = cl(A) ∩ CA, 
since A is open. For bd(bd(A)), one obtains bd(bd(A)) = bd((cl(A) ∩ CA)) = (cl(A) ∩ 
CA) ∩ cl(C(cl(A) ∩ )). Obviously, cl(C(cl(A) ∩ CA) = cl(C(cl(A) ∪ CA)) = cl(C(cl(A)) 
∪ )) = cl(X) = X. Hence, bd(bd(A)) = bd(A).
The boundary of a closed set B equals the boundary of its open complement CB. 
Thus, the boundaries of open sets and those of closed sets are columnar.♦
Corollary 7.4 For all topological spaces (X, OX), all A ⊆ X are stably columnar, 
i.e., bd(bd(bd(A))) = bd(bd(A)).
Proof By definition, bd(A) is closed. Applying Proposition 4.3 to bd(A), one imme-
diately obtains bd(bd(bd(A))) = bd(bd(A)). ♦
Thus, in the general case, the column of higher-order boundaries {bdn (A)}n∈N of 
a set A starts with a “pedestal” bd(A) on which equal layers  bd2(A),  bd3(A), … ad 
infinitum.15
Lemma 7.5 For all (X, OX), one has bd(a) = bd(bd(a)) iff int(bd(a)) = Ø.
Proof Assume bdbd(a) = bd(a). Then, calculate
The class of columnar sets contains more than just open sets and closed sets:
Lemma 7.6 For every topological space (X, OX) and A ⊆ X, one has int(bd(A)) = Ø 
iff A satisfies the topological McKinsey axiom: int(cl(A)) ⊆ cl(int(A)) ⇔ int(bd(A)) = 
Ø.
Proof 
Recall that set A ⊆ X is nowhere dense iff intcl(A) = Ø. Closed set A is nowhere 
dense iff complement CA is dense in X. As is well known, the finite intersection of 
dense open sets is again dense. Equivalently, the finite union of closed nowhere-
dense sets is still nowhere dense. The following equivalent formulation using these 
concepts of Lemma 7.6 will be useful:
bd(a) = bd(bd(a))⇔bd(a) = bd(a)) ∩ cl(Cbd(a))⇔ bd(a) = bd(a) ∩ cl(Cbd(a))
⇔bd(a) ⊆ cl(Cbd(a))⇔ bd(a) ⊆ Cint(bd(a))
⇔int(bd(a)) ∩ bd(a) = � ⇔ int(bd(a)) = �.⧫
int(cl(A)) ⊆ cl(int(A)) ⇔ int(cl(A)) ∩ Ccl(int(A)) = �
⇔ int(cl(A)) ∩ CCintC(int(A)) = � ⇔ int(cl(A)) ∩ C(int(A)) = �
⇔ int(cl(A)) ∩ C(int(A)) = � ⇔ int(bd(A)) = �.⧫
15 The expression “pedestal” is inspired by the idea that bd(A) ⊇ bd2(A) = bd3(A) = … = bdn(A) … ad 
infinitum.
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Proposition 7.7 For every topological space (X, OX), one has
Now, we can prove the following:
Theorem 7.8 For every topological space (X, OX), set MKX of columnar subsets of 
X is a Boolean algebra.
Proof We already know that A ∈ MKX iff CA ∈ MKX. Assume A and B to be 
columnar. Then, A ∪ B is also shown to be columnar by the following calculation:
Since bd(A) and bd(B) are closed and nowhere-dense sets, their union 
bd(A) ∪ bd(B) is nowhere dense as well, i.e., int(bd(A) ∪ bd(B)) = Ø. Thus, 
intbd(A ∪ B) = Ø. Similarly, bd(A ∩ B) is shown to be nowhere dense by the follow-
ing calculation using de Morgan’s laws for set-theoretical operations ∩ and ∪:
Hence, if bd(A) and bd(B) are nowhere dense, then bd(A ∩ B) is nowhere dense, 
too. In sum, set MKX of McKinsey sets of (X, OX) is a Boolean algebra.♦
Corollary 7.9 Let L be a propositional language with atomic sentences a, b … and 
the usual Boolean connectives ¬, ∧, ∨, and →, and let (X, OX) be a topological 
space. Then, a columnar interpretation L —r—> MKX of P is defined by mapping 
the atomic sentence a, b, onto elements r(a), r(b), … of MKX and interpreting the 
logical connectives by their set-theoretical counterparts C, ∩, ∪…. ♦
In sum, if the concept of vagueness is cast in the framework of an S4 operator 
(such as Bobzien’s C), the corresponding boundary operator bd is always stably 
columnar  (bd3 = bd2) and quite often even columnar  (bd2 = bd). One may conjecture 
that this is because C satisfies C • C = C, i.e., axiom 4. This is, however, not quite 
right. As will be shown in the next section, also for Williamson’s logic of clarity 
based on an operator C* that does not satisfy axiom 4, a well behaved boundary 
operator  bdBDG (see Definition 8.6) can be defined that is stably columnar as well.
8  Columnar Vagueness in Williamson’s Logic of Clarity
In the appendix of Vagueness (Williamson 1994), the author gives a succinct sketch 
of a modal logic of clarity based on an operator C* such that C*A is to be read as “It 
is clearly the case that A”. For fixed margin models (the only type of models of the 
logic of clarity we will consider in the following), C* defines a modal logic KTB.
bd(bd(A)) = bd(A) iff bd(A) is nowhere dense, i.e., intcl(bd(A)) ≠ �.⧫
bd(A ∪ B) = cl(A ∪ B) ∩ cl(C(A ∪ B)) = (cl(A) ∪ cl(B)) ∩ (cl(CA) ∩ cl(CB))
⊆ (cl(A) ∩ (cl(CA) ∩ cl(CB)) ∪ (cl(B)) ∩ (cl(CA) ∩ cl(CB))
⊆ (cl(A) ∩ cl(CA)) ∪ (cl(B) ∩ cl(CB)) = bd(A) ∪ bd(B).
bd(A ∩ B) = bd(C(A ∩ B)) = bd(CA ∪ CB)) ⊆ bd(CA) ∪ bd(CB) = bd(A) ∪ bd(B)
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Definition 8.1 The modal logic of clarity operator C* is defined as an extension of 
classical Boolean propositional logic by a unary sentential operator C* such that for 
all well-formed formulas A and B, the following expression are valid:
(1) C*(A —> B) —> (C*A —> C*B) (Axiom K)
(2) C*A —> A (Axiom T)
(3) CA —> C*CC*A (Axiom B)
(4) If |— A, then |— C*A. (Rule of 
Necessita-
tion).♦
The details are as follows: We start with a similarity (W, ~), where W is a set (of 
possible worlds) and relation ~ is a binary similarity relation that is reflexive and 
symmetric but not necessarily transitive. As usual, sentences A are subsets of W. 
For x ∈ W, define the similarity neighbourhood co(x) as co(x) := {y; x ~ y}. Then, we 
check that for fixed margin models Williamson’s clarity operator C* can be defined 
as
One observes that C* in general does not satisfy C* • C* = C* (Axiom 4). Nev-
ertheless, it is possible to define a new boundary operator that is related to C* and is 
stably columnar. This issue may be of interest to the reader since this new boundary 
operator is treated neither in Williamson (1994) nor in Williamson (1999). The only 
boundary operator BD* that is discussed in Williamson (1999, pp. 136–138) is the 
one that is defined with the aid of C* in full formal analogy to (3.2):
As Williamson rightly remarks, this operator has intuitively rather implausible 
properties. This holds, in particular, for the behaviour of BD* with respect to itera-
tions. More precisely, the details are as follows. As usual denote the nth iteration of 
the operator BD* by BD*n. Then one may ask, whether the operator BD* is stably 
columnar in the sense that BD*n = BD*n+1 for some natural number n ≥ 1. In Wil-
liamson (1999) it is shown by explicit examples that BD* is not stably columnar 
(see Appendix of Williamson 1999).16
The boundary operator to be used in the following is different from BD*. More 
precisely, we will use a “slim” version of BD* that enjoys better properties. This 
slim version of BD* was investigated by Breysse and de Glas in detail, see Breysse 
and De Glas (2007) (without being aware of Williamson’s logic of clarity). Their 
(8.2)퐂∗A ∶= {x;co(x) ⊆ A}
(8.3)퐁퐃∗A ∶= NOT퐂∗A&NOT (퐂∗(NOTA)))
16 Williamson uses the operator BD* to define two concepts of higher order vagueness: A sentence A is 
said to be nth-order borderline vague if BD*n(A) ≠ Ø. Somewhat more complicated is the definition of 
nth-order vagueness that uses first order vagueness BD*(Cn(A)) of certain “classifications”  Cn(A) of A, 
 Cn(A) being sets of sentences generated by A and the operator C*. The relation between nth-order bor-
derline vagueness and nth-order vagueness is complicated.
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approach is essentially equivalent to Williamson’s approach of fixed margin models 
based on a similarity structure (W, ~) as defined above.
To define the slim version of BD* Breysse and De Glas proceed as follows. Given 
(W, ~), they define operators PW —h—> PW and PW —s—> PW such that h is a 
(non-topological) interior kernel operator and s = C • h • C is a (non-topological) 
closure operator. More precisely, h is just Williamson’s operator C*. As is easily 
seen, h and s satisfy
Then, operators h and s are used to define various concepts of a boundary to be 
discussed in more detail in the following. To avoid confusing the reader with a mix-
ture of different terminologies and denotations, in the rest of this section, we will use 
the terminology of Breysse and De Glas (2011). In particular, Williamson’s operator 
C* is denoted by h. Then, we obtain:
Proposition 8.5 Let (W, ~) be a similarity structure. Then, operators h and s 
defined above, for all A ⊆ W, have the following properties:
(i) h(A) ⊆ A ⊆ s(A).
(ii) h(A ∩ B) = h(A) ∩ h(B), s(A ∪ B) = s(A) ∪ s(B).
(iii) sh(A) ⊆ A ⊆ hs(A).
(iv) hs is a closure operator; i.e., hs satisfies the 
Kuratowski axioms (2.1)(2)–(4).17The operator hs 
is not, however, a topological closure operator; 
i.e., in general, hs(A) ∪ hs(B) = hs(A ∪ B) does not 
hold.♦
As Breysse and De Glas show, operators h and s define a very useful and rich con-
cept of a boundary (cf. Breysse and De Glas 2007, 230ff) as follows:
Definition 8.6 Let (W, ~) be a similarity space with operators h and s as defined 
above. Then, a boundary operator  bdBDG can be defined for A ⊆ W by
♦
The operators  bdBDG and BD* are related as follows:
(8.4)h(A) = {x;co(x) ⊆ A} s(A) =
{
x;co(x) ∩ A ≠ �
}
bdBDG(A) ∶= hs(A) ∩ hs(CA) = h(s(A) ∩ s(CA)).
(8.7)bdBDG(A) ∶= h(퐁퐃 ∗(A))
17 The pair (h, s) is well known to be a Galois connection on PW (cf. Denecke et al. 2004). This fact, not 
observed by Breysse and De Glas, has many interesting consequences, but it is outside the scope of the 
present paper.
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Since hA ⊆ A, one has  bdBDG(A) ⊆ BD*(A), and  bdBDG may be intuitively char-
acterized as a slim variant of BD*. While BD* shows a rather erratic behaviour, its 
slim variant  bdBDG behaves much better, as shown by the following theorem:
Theorem 8.8 Operator bdBDG defined by Definition 8.6 is stably columnar for all 
A ⊆ W:
Proof The proof is carried out by using (8.2)(i)–(iv) and some other familiar proper-
ties of closure operators. By definition,
If we can prove that Csh(bdBDG(bdBDG(A)) = W, we are done. This is carried out 
as follows:
Clearly  hbdBDG(A)) ∩ hCh(bdBDG(A)) ⊆ hbdBDG(A)) ∩ Ch(bdBDG(A)) = Ø.♦
In sum, both Bobzien’s S4 logic of clearness based on C and Williamson’s non-
S4 logic of clarity for fixed margin models based on C* give rise to stably columnar 
boundary operators bd and  bdBDG.18
9  Concluding Remarks
If one relies on topological, i.e., S4 models of modal operators C and U, columnar 
vagueness crops up in more places than is usually assumed, be it in its strict version 
(i.e., for all subsets of weakly scattered spaces, or at least for all columnar sets of 
arbitrary spaces) or in a weaker form as stably columnar vagueness for all subsets of 
all topological spaces.19 This entails, in particular, that vague concepts, when rep-
resented by open subsets of conceptual spaces, are columnar. An analogous result 
holds for fixed margin models (W, ~) that lead to a KTB logic of the modal operator 
C*.
bdBDG
(
bdBDG
(
bdBDG(A)
))
= bdBDG
(
bdBDG(A)
)
.
bdBDG
(
bdBDG
(
bdBDG(A)
))
= hs(bdBDG
(
bdBDG(A)
)
∩ hs(CbdBDG
(
bdBDG(A)
)
= bdBDG
(
bdBDG(A)
)
∩ Csh(bdBDG
(
bdBDG(A)
)
.
Csh(bdBDG
(
bdBDG(A)
)
=W ⇔ sh(bdBDG
(
bdBDG(A)
)
= � ⇔ h(bdBDG
(
bdBDG(A)
)
= �
⇔ h(hs(bdBDG(A) ∩ hs
(
CbdBDG(A)
)
= �
⇔ h(bdBDG(A) ∩ hCh
(
bdBDG(A)
)
= �
⇔ hbdBDG(A)) ∩ hCh
(
bdBDG(A)
)
= �.
18 As Williamson points out, the logic of variable margin models does not satisfy the Brouwer axiom 
(B) (cf. Williamson 1994, 272). As is easily calculated, this entails that the operator hs is no longer a 
closure operator.
19 Examples of such topology-affine approaches to vagueness dealt with in this paper are that of 
Bobzien, Rumfitt, Williamson, Sainbury, and Wright.
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Thus, if one rejects columnar vagueness for one philosophical reason or other, 
one must reject S4 or KTB models of vagueness altogether. On the other hand, if 
one accepts an S4 approach for the clearness operator C or a KTB approach for the 
clarity operator C*, one must buy into columnar vagueness for the resulting concept 
of a (slim) boundary at least if one restricts one’s consideration to classical modal 
logic, i.e., normal modal logic. The situation may be different if one gives up nor-
mality. However, this is not an issue to be treated in this paper.
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